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The old notion that industrialization jackhammered the traditional family into atomistic 
pieces--that industrial capitalism was incompatible with preindustrial household relationships--
has now virtually been abandoned by historians. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the 
family, as an institution, proved remarkably resilient and flexible in dealing with the economic 
changes that transformed America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, not 
only did the traditional family survive smokestack America, it also served as a fundamental 
component of labor mobilization. The family proved central to the processes of labor migration 
and work force participation, even as it facilitated the persistence of older cultural norms in the 
industrial setting.1 
Yet it is difficult to believe that industrialization did not infuse working-class households 
with new and unsettling tensions, particularly between parents and their wage-earning daughters. 
As more "working girls" entered America's factories and became essential contributors to the 
family wage economy, many working-class households faced the matter of a daughter's wages. 
Would the daughter get to keep the wages she earned or would she give them to her parents? Who 
decided? Did a young woman's contribution to the family coffer earn her a greater degree of 
personal autonomy? If parents were dependent on their daughters' wages, could those daughters 
bargain for greater control over their own affairs? 
For working-class households in the early twentieth century, these questions went to the 
heart of parental authority and the meaning of accumulation. For most Americans prior to the 
late nineteenth century, making a living involved farm work or crafts mixed with domestic 
industry; the survival strategies for these households amounted to a family production economy. 
But the rise of large-scale industry and town-based manufacturing prompted the creation of the 
family wage economy, which was based on the cumulative earnings family members brought home 
from wage labor outside the home. The difference was not trivial in the least. Traditional 
productive behaviors, even if altered by a commercial orientation or by increased poverty and 
dependence, placed little strain on economic relationships within the household; that is, parental 
power was based squarely on productive power. Not so in a family wage economy, in which the 
wages brought home by children could, and often did, outweigh that of a working father or 
mother. For poor households, the economic center could shift quite rapidly, and such a transfer 
could not easily occur without a corresponding renegotiation in basic family relationships. 
For scholars interested in the relationship between industrialization and gender the issue of 
working girls and wages raises a much larger question: did industrialization, by promoting 
economic autonomy among working girls, create greater possibilities for individual freedom for 
women? The historian Edward Shorter launched the debate nearly two decades ago when he 
charted the rise of female "emancipation" in Europe from the eighteenth century to the mid-
twentieth. He argued that women's "involvement in the economy of the market place [was] the 
principal motor of emancipation." In his view, "Industrial growth fragmented the customary 
'family economy' by making individual producers of its separate members. And, for the children, 
at least, independence accompanied wage labor." Independence in the economic marketplace 
meant less domination by parents and therefore a type of free agency in marriage and family 
markets, all of which diminished female subordination to husbands and led to a subsequent 
decline in birth rates. 2 
Recently, scholars from a variety of disciplines have addressed this issue, directly and 
indirectly. Economists have examined changing family survival strategies, pointed toward the 
importance of working girls to industrial growth, and attempted to model the shift from 
cooperative familialism to market-oriented individualism among young women workers. 
Demographers and family historians have questioned how the changes in women's work affected 
the family life course and basic patterns of marriage and fertility. Labor historians have 
reexamined the role of wage-earning women in the working-class community and have analyzed 
whether the presence of working girls in the labor force facilitated or hindered worker solidarity 
and resistance to managerial discipline. All of these studies intersect with a growing body of 
literature by historians of labor and gender that considers whether factory work held different 
meanings and consequences for females. Can we trace women's independence, empowerment, and 
sisterhood (or the lack thereof) to the emergence of female wage work in the industrial 
revolution? Did gainful employment in the capitalist labor market emancipate young women from 
traditional roles, or did it serve to strengthen customary roles within the changing economic 
system?3 
Some recent works seem to side with Shorter. Sara Evans's synthesis of American women's 
history, for example, argues that young single women at the turn of the century, being "relatively 
economically autonomous and freed either by work or school from intense familial supervision ... 
began to appropriate a more individualistic ethos for themselves." Social experimentation then 
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provided important new outlets for female self expression, but, Evans notes, when working-class 
women "found mates they withdrew again into the family circle and a life with little space for 
leisure or pleasure."4 
This apparent bifurcation of working-class womanhood--from a childhood of emergent 
independence to an adulthood of domestic tradition--is a recurrent theme in several recent works, 
including two books on working women in New York city. Christine Stansell, focusing on the 
antebellum period, argues that "wage earning in the industrial city ... put considerable strain on 
corporate family forms, especially in the case of young women. Daughters worked to help their 
families, but they also used their wages to distance themselves from parental authority." This 
independence normally took the form of social, often sexual, amusements, which middle class 
reformers and many working-class parents viewed with considerable angst. Though fleeting, 
limited, and sometimes self -destructive, such personal independence, Stansell argues, offered the 
possibility of a larger "political vision of women's freedom" and created "unforeseen possibilities" 
for poor working women.5 Kathy Peiss's study of female working-class leisure during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century illuminates a similar demand for social autonomy, with 
much the same consequences for young women. In the dance halls and amusement parks of the 
teeming city, "young working women had defined a style that in some ways subverted the 
traditional bases of their dependency--as dutiful daughters in the patriarchal immigrant family 
and as submissive workers in a capitalist economy." Yet ultimately Peiss's women confronted the 
limits of social liberation, which, however much it enhanced individual self expression, failed to 
alter the basic social structure that rendered poor women sexually vulnerable and economically 
dependent. Socially daring peer-group adventures only briefly forestalled, and did not alter, the 
drudgery and hardship of marriage and motherhood that lay ahead for most working girls.6 
Leslie Woodcock Tentler's analysis of working women and household relationships in the 
early twentieth century argues that the factory experience exerted a strong conservative influence 
on young women. Placing women's work within the family life-cycle, Tentler focuses on young 
women's lives during the critical period between school and marriage, during which working-class 
daughters invariably worked for wages outside the home. Rather than liberating young women 
from traditional dependencies and ideas, Tentler argues, factory work only reinforced their 
"domestic destiny." The "strong and controlling bonds of obligation and loyalty" that held working 
class families together "were especially strong for daughters ... [for whom] wage earning was an 
essentially domestic obligation~" Whatever examples of familial tensions were evident, working 
girls remained intensely loyal to their parents in all things. "Neither the emotional nor the 
economic realities of working-class life," Tentler argues, "prepared them to assume a role 
independent of this loyalty." Poor wages, poor work conditions, poor chances for advancement--
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all justified by the notion that young women were temporary workers (which became a self-
fulfilling prophecy)--encouraged female workers to opt for the relative security and well-being of 
motherhood. Coming of age as essential wage earners in working-class families, young women 
continued their working lives as mothers and economic managers, working for wages outside the 
home only when the exigencies of poverty and family crisis demanded it. From domestic 
obligations as a daughter to domestic obligations as a wife: that was the pattern of life for most 
working-class women.7 
All of these studies suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that the wages a daughter earned were 
pivotal to the internal dynamics of working-class families. As yet, however, historians have 
shown more interest in the social behavior of working daughters than in the nitty-gritty of wage 
bargaining within the home. It is widely held that, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, single children working for wages and still living at home contributed some, if not all, of 
their earnings to the family. But we actually know very little about how much money wage-
earning daughters typically got to keep, or what factors determined who was able to keep 
something. The economic bargains that were struck between working-girls and their parents have 
received little empirical analysis. 
This essay attempts to redress this imbalance by analyzing data on wage-earning daughters 
who were working in the American textile industry in the early twentieth century, were sixteen 
years or older, and were still living at home with their parents. The data is taken from a massive 
report undertaken by the Bureau of Labor in 1907-8. We will examine the amount of earnings 
these cotton-mill women were able to keep for themselves, as well as the various influences--
individual and familial--that were related to wage-keeping. Equally important, this article 
explores the role that region played in shaping family-wage negotiations and gender relations. 
New England and the South dominated American textiles, but the two regions were very 
different, culturally and economically. Did young women in the New England states, a more 
modern environment than the newly industrializing South, keep more wages and experience 
greater economic autonomy than their peers in Dixie, a region known for its devotion to 
patriarchy and familial tradition? 
The Economic Context and the Data 
By 1900, the American textile industry had been a dominant part of the national economy 
for more than eighty years. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, large-scale textile 
manufacturing had taken off in New England, a regional development that sprang partly from 
some timely technological smuggling from Great Britain, the world textile leader at the time, from 
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the disruption of trade during the War of 1812, and from a growing surplus of child and female 
labor in rural New England. This last factor was particularly critical, for it was cheap labor that 
initially distinguished the industry, and it was the absence of cheap labor in the antebellum South 
that initially shut Dixie out of large-scale textile manufacturing. Only in the postbellum era, with 
the commercial reorientation of the southern countryside and the subsequent economic dislocation 
of so many farm families, did the South experience its own industrial take off. Not surprisingly, 
the South's foremost industry was textiles, which did not require a highly skilled work force or 
large capital outlays. In both regions, cheap labor was often synonymous with female labor, and 
by the early twentieth century, cotton textiles employed by far the largest number of women 
workers of any industry, North and South. In 1905, more than one in ten of all wage-earning 
women in the United States was working in a cotton mill.8 
The regional differences separating northern mills from southern mills were marked as the 
new century dawned. Most mills in New England were well established and produced high-grade 
cloth; they were generally located in or near major urban areas and were larger than most mills in 
the South. In Dixie, most mills were still relatively new, having been built during the take-off 
period of the 1880s and 1890s, with many new mills popping up on the outskirts of small towns 
throughout the southern Piedmont. The principal product, coarse textile cloth, was appropriate to 
a region that had no heritage of industrial skill upon which to draw. The central difference 
between northern and southern mills was their labor supply. Since the late 1840s, New England 
textiles had relied on successive waves of immigrant labor: the Irish and Germans before the Civil 
War; the French Canadians, who came after and were still the dominate group in the early 
twentieth century; and, beginning in the 1890s, the Poles, Portuguese, Italians and others from 
southern and eastern Europe. Virtually none of these immigrants or their children made their way 
to the South, where millhands were almost all white, native-born southerners of southern-born 
parents. There was no labor exchange between the two sections. Cotton mills North and South 
operated within a nationally integrated economy, but their labor markets were completely isolated 
and regionally distinctive.9 
Two important characteristics of the American textile industry crossed regional lines. 
First, in both regions, textile work was low-wage factory work. Northern wage scales in textiles 
far exceeded those in the South, the nation's poorest section; but within New England's more 
diverse industrial economy, textile wages were relatively low. Second, family labor systems were 
the rule in both regions. It was just as common in Fall River, Massachusetts, as in Greensboro, 
South Carolina, to find several household members working in the same mill, with plenty of other 
kin along side. Very young children, below the age of 14, were more likely to be working in 
5 
Dixie than in New England, due to child-labor statutes in the North, but the overall pattern of 
family labor was everywhere apparent in the cotton mills. 10 
Because the textile industry employed so many children and young women, it became the 
focus of considerable concern and criticism during the progressive-era, as reformers rallied 
around the issues of child labor and female labor. By about 1905, these concerns had bubbled up 
to the U.S. Senate, which subsequently commissioned the Bureau of Labor to undertake a massive 
fact-finding investigation. The result was the 19 volume Report on Condition of Woman and 
Child Wage-Earners in the United States, published in 1910. The data on the cotton textile 
industry was gathered by federal agents in late 1907 and early 1908. Information was gathered in 
all the leading textile states and some minor ones in New England and the South. 
Here I analyze data from three New England states--Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island--which led that region's textile production, and from the three leading southern states--
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Federal agents claimed to have collected the data 
systematically, taking samples from a variety of mills-- urban, small-town, and rural; large, 
medium, and small-- in accordance to the distribution of the textile industry in each particular 
state. The New England sample consisted of 928 female employees, the southern sample of 1001. 
The federal data is rich in information for each working girl and her family. Facts about 
each woman's job and her earnings during a "normal" pay period were obtained from company 
payrolls. Other information was gathered from an interview with the working-daughter and her 
family. Some of the data reflected the woman's own personal attributes--age, years experience on 
the job, literacy, annual earnings--while other offered details regarding the household that 
woman lived in--such as the number of children in the home and their ages, the annual family 
earnings, the occupation of the father, and whether the mother worked for wages outside the 
home. 11 
The amount of wages that each working-girl personally retained for herself must be 
estimated, as that figure was not gathered by federal investigators. The data includes an estimate 
of each woman's annual earnings (I), the total annual earnings of all children in the family who 
were sixteen years of age or older (C), and the total amount those older children got to keep for 
themselves (K).12 To estimate the earnings that each working-girl personally retained, I assumed 
that a woman's take from K reflected the extent of her contribution to C. So, if her annual 
earnings amounted to 50 percent of C, I assumed that she received 50 percent of K. The result is 
the variable Share, which indicates in dollars the amount of a mill girl's annual earnings she 
retained for herself. 
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Except for a few cases in which the working girl was the only child in her family over 
sixteen, Share is an estimate. One potential bias in the estimate stems from the fact that we do 
not know the gender of the other older children in the household. The Senate report stated that 
male children in both regions were more likely to keep their earnings than female children--that 
fact itself an important indication of gender roles. If this statement was accurate, the variable 
Share may be inflated for those women in the sample with large numbers of older brothers.13 
On the other hand, brothers and older sisters of cotton mill girls were sometimes engaged in work 
that did not bring in steady wages or any wages at all (day labor and farm labor for brothers; 
housekeeping for sisters), in which case the working girl's earnings far exceeded her siblings, the 
result being that Share might be underestimated. Since the two potential biases push in opposite 
directions, the estimation errors may well cancel out. In any event, as shall be seen, the vast 
majority of children over sixteen kept none of their wages, and "zero," in this case, is a figure 
unencumbered by estimating procedures. 
Before analyzing the data, some assumptions and qualifications ought to be stated 
explicitly. First, I assume that the allocation of a daughter's wages (i.e., the determination of who 
got command of those wages once the woman brought them home) was determined by a 
bargaining process within the family. The extent to which this was a conscious process is 
unknown. In some instances arguments between parents and their daughters, or even between 
parents, may have raged before a bargain was struck. And some daughters who wanted to keep 
some money for themselves but got to keep none might have said there was not much bargaining 
to it--that the loss of their wages was a simple matter of parental authoritarianism. In other 
households, working girls may have given over their entire earnings without hesitation or 
deliberation, as if it were the natural thing to do. If older siblings had been through the process 
before, a young girl doubtless entered a bargaining arena that was already shaped by prior 
agreements. The data cannot tease out such subtleties, but if we take a broad definition of 
"bargaining," one that includes wage allocations in which daughters had little say (due to previous 
arrangements or clearly understood notions of parental dominance), we can assume that, at some 
level, the amount of a working girl's wages she got to keep resulted from a process of negotiation. 
That such bargains were in fact being negotiated was evident to the federal investigators, 
who found that southern working girls, by virtue of their contribution to the family income, were 
granted some special privileges. "Nearly always," the report noted, the child's pay envelope "is 
turned over to the parent unopened. There is no question as to this--it is taken as a matter of 
course." The report did not consider whether the parent then redistributed some of those wages to 
the children, but it did point to a socially visible bargain: "It is true, however, that the child at 
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work in the mill has a certain economic independence in the family not accorded to the children 
not earning wages .... The little girl is not so often asked to "mind the baby" or to wash the 
dishes. These duties usually devolve upon the oldest schoolgirl, who, in consequence, develops a 
strong desire to enter the mill as soon as she can."14 
The second assumption is that a woman's ability to keep her wages was a reflection of 
economic independence. A corollary to this point is that the degree to which a working girl 
enjoyed such autonomy was indicated by the proportion of her earnings she kept. In an empirical 
sense, a woman who kept 80 percent of her wages had more economic independence than one who 
kept 30 percent; and both may be said to have more personal autonomy than women who gave all 
of their earnings to parents. Of course, there was much more to female autonomy than wages, but 
retaining wages for personal use would have been a new departure for daughters and it provides 
us with a clear means by which to gauge the extent of the change. True, a working girl's ability to 
retain her wages did not necessarily affect a long-term change in gender roles. Keeping wages 
did not, by itself, weaken a girl's bonds to her family. Young women who kept their wages 
sometimes spent the money on younger siblings. For example, Patricia Lowrance, who grew up in 
a Georgia mill village during the 1930s, recalled that "when a girl earned her first paycheck in the 
mill, it was customary for her to buy all her younger sisters a new pair of shoes, or a new dress, 
which they otherwise couldn't have had."15 There is no reason to suspect this was not also the 
case for an earlier generation. Having command of one's own wages, in other words, did not 
necessarily entail a break from cultural norms. And even if a working woman were able to keep 
all of her earnings, it would not have been enough for her to be a woman of independent means. 
Still, keeping wages was no trivial matter for a young woman, even for those who spent their 
money on family. Choosing to purchase something for siblings or parents was, after all, an 
independent economic decision made by the working-woman herself. 
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The Results 
Most mill-working women in 1908 never made independent economic decisions, because 
most of them never retained any of their earnings for personal use. Out of a sample of 1,929 
wage-earning daughters, 70.5 percent kept none of their annual earnings. Only 29.6 percent laid 
claim to some of the money from their own paycheck, and these young women, on average, kept 
only 33.5 percent of their earnings. These results alone offer a simple and powerful refutation of 
Shorter's thesis, but there is far more to the story. 
One might well assume that these national figures masked significant regional differences, 
and that young working women were more likely to keep some of their earnings if they lived in 
New England. According to many contemporary observers and latter-day historians, the South's 
poor white mill workers were singularly committed to a conventional, patriarchal social order, in 
which wives were submissive to husbands, and children, especially daughters, were subservient to 
parents. Moreover, nothing in turn-of -the-century southern society--poor and economically 
underdeveloped as it was--seemed to impinge on customary lines of familial authority. In the 
New England states, by contrast, signs of modernity where everywhere to be seen. Rapid urban 
growth, a diverse and burgeoning economy, a heterogeneous population overflowing with recently 
arrived immigrants, more opportunities for working women, a stronger commitment to education: 
these were emblematic of a dynamic region in which the rules of social custom were in flux. 
Table 1 highlights some distinctions between cotton mill girls in New England and the South. 
Although essentially the same age as their southern peers, northern women earned more money, 
were better educated, were more likely to have mothers working for wages outside the home (a 
high of 10.1 percent in Massachusetts), and were more likely to have been raised in an urban 
environment than on a farm. They worked in the area that, by every reasonable index, offered 
the possibility of greater personal autonomy. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 demonstrates, among other things, how little we know about the process of 
modernization. It also suggests that we pay closer attention to interregional variation in our 
historical analysis of women, labor, and culture. Contrary to all expectation, wage-earning 
daughters in the economically backward and (supposedly) culturally impervious South were far 
more likely to keep some of their annual earnings than New England's cotton mill girls. Nearly 40 
percent of Dixie's working women retained control of at least a portion of their cotton-mill 
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earnings; only one in five northern women did so, a difference loaded with statistical significance, 
as indicated by the high chi-square statistic. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The state-level variations on wage-keeping presented in Table 3 reinforce the regional 
statistics. In no New England state did the percentage of wage keepers exceed that of any 
southern state. Maine, with the best record of wage retention among northern states, stood four 
percentage points below Georgia, which had the worst record among southern states. The 27 
percentage-point difference between North Carolina and Massachusetts highlights these surprising 
trends. Massachusetts, the most diverse, urban, and culturally malleable state, was also the only 
state in which the proportion of women who kept some of their wages fell below 20 percent. 
Then consider North Carolina: most mill girls there lived in small-towns or company own-mill 
villages; virtually everyone who worked in the mills was a native-born southerner of southern-
born parents; average annual earnings for cotton mill girls and for cotton mill families were the 
lowest of all six states; 89 percent of the mothers of mill girls were housewives (and those who 
were not were more likely to be dead than working for wages outside the home); the rate of 
illiteracy among mill girls was highest of any textile state, exceeding 25 percent. Yet it was in 
North Carolina that wage earning daughters were most likely to control some of their paycheck. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Region, then, seems to have made a critical difference, but 20 percent of the wage-
earning daughters in New England also got to keep something, which raises the question of what 
factors, nationwide, were related to wage-keeping. Why did a minority of young women succeed 
in retaining wages? Was their success a function of age, whereby older daughters were more 
likely to keep some wages? Or was it due to their earning capabilities, their job skills, or their 
levels of education? If they kept wages for these reasons, it might well be argued that a working-
girl's individual traits did in fact contribute to her economic independence and that, to some 
degree at least, factory work served to amplify her personal autonomy. On the other hand, a 
woman's ability to control her wages might have had more to do with family matters than with her 
own individual characteristics. Did a working girl's power to retain her earnings stem from 
family size or the number of younger siblings in the household? For example, a woman in a 
household filled with older wage-earning children might be more likely to keep her wages than 
one who was the only wage-earner in a family filled with very young children. Perhaps, too, the 
difference was linked to whether she came from a single-parent household, or to the household 
head's occupation. If family circumstances were the central determinate in wage-keeping 
calculations, then it could hardly be argued that a woman's ability to retain her earnings was in 
any way emancipative. If a woman's place in her family, and the peculiar composition of that 
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family, were major factors in the process, then keeping wages (from the perspective of the 
individual working girl) was principally a matter of chance, not individual agency. 
To examine these questions I have employed a logit model using the dichotomous measure 
Keepers as my dependent variable (Keepers= 1 if woman kept some wages, 0 otherwise) and a 
variety of individual and familial characteristics as my independent variables.16 The 
independent variables are defined at the bottom of Table 4. The first three variables (A, I, W) 
measure personal traits: age, earnings power, and skill level. It was assumed that all three would 
be positively related to wage keeping.17 The variable for annual Family earnings (F) was 
expected to be positively related to Keepers, the idea being that the larger the family coffer, the 
less pressure on a working daughter to relinquish all of her paycheck. Younger siblings (Y) and 
Older siblings (0 ), both being indicators of family structure, were expected to work in opposite 
directions: Y would force a greater financial burden on older daughters, while 0 would enhance 
one's chances of keeping some wages. Daughters from single-parent households (S) were assumed 
to be less likely to be keepers, since, other things being equal, they would shoulder greater 
financial burdens for the household. Daughters with mothers working outside the home for wages 
(M), a variable surprisingly unrelated to S, was assumed to have a positive relationship to 
Keepers. 18 Having a father who worked in the textile industry (D) was assumed to have a 
negative relationship on southerners, where notions of patriarchal dominance were purportedly so 
strong, and an uncertain relationship on northern women. 
Table 4 shows, first of all, the basic model run separately for the two regions, the results 
of which are curiously at odds. For southern women, 0 was positively and significantly related to 
keeping wages, but for northern women, 0 had no measurable effect. 19 In New England, the 
variable I was significant but also, strangely, negative: the more a northern mill daughter earned, 
the less likely she was to keep any of the money she brought home. So much for individual 
incentive. Two other family variables, F and Y, were significantly related (in the expected 
directions) to wage-keeping for northern women. For southerners, however, neither I nor F nor 
Y were significant determinants of wage-keeping. Only D was significant in both regional 
models, and yet the relationship ran in opposite directions in the two regions. Having a textile-
worker father in Dixie, contrary to expectation, was positively related to keeping one's earnings. 
In New England, wage-earning daughters whose fathers worked in the textile industry could 
basically expect to give away all of their earnings. 
[Table 4 about here] 
A national-level model that takes region into consideration can be derived by using the 
entire data set and adding a dummy variable for southerners. The regional dummy (R) indeed 
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showed that mill girls in Dixie were more apt to control part of their paychecks. With region 
accounted for in this model, variables F, Y, and 0 all proved significantly related to wage-
retention, and all with the expected sign. Variable/, which acted strangely in the previous New 
England model, lost its significance here, perhaps not surprisingly. More curious, though, was D's 
fall into insignificance, which resulted from the fact that dummy variable R accounts for 
differences in the intercept but it cannot account for divergent slopes. D slopes upward for 
southerners and down for those in New England, the result being that D, in the national model, 
appears to cancel out. Using bifurcated dummies forD, as in the final model presented here, 
clarifies this point. Here, R easily retains its significance, and the divergent realities for 
northerners with textile fathers (ND) and their southern counterparts (SD) are clearly indicated. 
This alteration in the model teases out a key regional difference without changing the other 
observed relationships. 
There are several stories here. First, in regard to the question of industrial work and 
female independence, Shorter's view cannot stand. Wage-earning daughters who successfully 
bargained for a share of their paycheck were not distinguished by maturity or talent on the 
job.20 Instead, family circumstances made the difference. Daughters whose families, as a 
whole, earned more money annually had more bargaining power, as did those who had large 
numbers of older siblings and few younger ones. A father's occupation mattered, as did the 
region in which one lived. In all, individual traits--skill, hard work, experience--did not count 
for much when it came to keeping one's wages. The factors that determined whether a mill girl 
retained some of her paycheck were beyond her control. There is no evidence that the system 
rewarded female initiative or sparked notions of female emancipation from familial control. 
And then there is the story of region. There is no simple explanation for something as 
counterintuitive as the southern advantage. Part of the answer, too, is hidden by multicollinearity: 
the split between regions might well fall along the lines nativity or religion, but the data will not 
allow for such exploration. The vast majority of northern women had foreign-born fathers and 
were from Catholic cultures (Irish, French Canadian, Italian, Polish, Portuguese), while virtually 
all southern women had native- born fathers and were reared in a culture imbued with evangelical 
Protestantism.21 R, therefore, could reflect southern-ness, white Protestant culture, American 
nativity, or some combination of all three. Perhaps native-born parents, even poor-white 
southern parents, were more accustomed than immigrant parents to thinking of their children as 
individuals in the free economic market. Perhaps the democratic autonomy of southern Protestant 
churches created an environment of autonomy within the household that was less prevalent among 
Catholic families. Other cultural explanations are plausible. Perhaps parents in Dixie's mill 
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villages were willing to entrust daughters with wages precisely because their cotton mill world was 
pervasively homogenous and culturally predictable. Or perhaps southern daughters had simply 
learned to bargain more effectively than their New England counterparts. 
Then there is the matter of textile-worker fathers. The divergent signs for ND and SD 
suggest that the regional trends may have been more structural than cultural. It is difficult, 
however, to determine what that structural component might have been. The proportion of 
textile-worker fathers was similar in both regions: 30 percent in New England; 27 percent in the 
South. In both North and South, wage-earning daughters and families with cotton-mill fathers 
earned more money, on average, than those whose fathers were not in textiles. In both regions, 
individual daughters of textile-worker fathers brought home 23 percent of total family income. 
One structural difference regards the comparative contributions of older children, in aggregate, to 
the family economy: in the South, children sixteen and over earned 56 percent of the household 
income; in New England, they earned 67 percent. In short, northern mill girls were more critical 
to their families' economic welfare than southern mill girls were. This fact offers a structural 
explanation for the overall regional discrepancy in wage-keeping. It does not, however, explain 
why ND and SD took different signs, because children of textile fathers contributed I 0 percent 
less to the family economy than other children in both regions. 
The answer to this conundrum may lie in the dissimilar manufacturing bases and levels of 
industrial development in the two regions. In Dixie, poor white fathers had very few wage-
earning options available to them other than cotton mill labor. Southern textile wages were 
pitifully low on a national scale, but from a regional perspective, cotton mill work was one of the 
few steady factory jobs a poor, unskilled white man could have in the South in 1908. Northern 
textiles paid higher wages than the southern mills, but New Englanders viewed cotton mills from 
the vantage point of an economy comparatively rich in wage-earning opportunities. Foreign-born 
workers and their children--recent immigrants hungry for work--filled northern mills because 
they were willing to toil for some of the lowest factory wages in New England. One recent history 
of Lawrence, Massachusetts, notes that by the late 191 Os, older workers had come to view textiles 
as synonymous with desperate immigrant labor and had come to view cotton mill work as being 
"beneath the native born."22 It is difficult to speak of southern mill workers, frequently scorned 
as the nation's lowest industrial workers, as having greater status and economic stability than New 
England textile workers, but perhaps, in a comparative sense, they did. And perhaps this provides 
a clue as to why daughters with cotton-mill fathers in Dixie had more success retaining some 
wages, and why those in New England had less success than their northern peers. 
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Expanding the logit model for New England reinforces the importance of nativity in 
keeping wages. The two logit models in Table 5 add to the basic model a different dummy 
variable: In model "A," variable F distinguishes daughters of native-born and foreign-born 
fathers; in model "B," the dummy NI distinguishes women from newer immigrant groups (eastern 
and southern Europeans) from those of more established groups. The result for NI reveals that 
women from the newer immigrant groups (Poles, Portuguese, Italians) were not less likely to keep 
than those from older immigrant groups; but it should be said that the measurement for NI was 
somewhat unrefined, because French Canadians, although generally an older immigrant cohort, 
were still sending new recruits to the mills. Given the available data, N provides the best means 
of distinguishing between different groups of New Englanders, and the results of model "A" 
further confirm what was indirectly suggested by the dummy variable for southern women in 
table 4: daughters of native-born fathers were more likely to keep than daughters of foreign-born 
fathers. In virtually all of the literature on southern textile workers, Dixie's white working class is 
assumed to be more culturally conservative than northern workers. Future analyses in both 
regions should pay more attention to interregional differences and, given the result for N in table 
5, more attention to native-born, foreign-born discrepancies.23 
[Table 5 about here] 
In both regions, family circumstances, not individual characteristics, determined who got 
to keep some of their cotton-mill earnings, which meant that mill wages were hardly liberating for 
working-class daughters. But the problem can be explored further by asking a separate question: 
among those who retained a portion of their earnings, who got to keep more? This question can 
be answered by means of a standard ordinary least-squares regression (OLS) limited to "keepers" 
only. The basic OLS model in Tables 6 and 7 is a condensed version of the earlier, fuller logit 
model. 24 The approach here is basically the same. The dependent variable is share, defined as 
the estimated dollar amount each woman was able keep from her annual earnings. The collection 
of independent variables includes three individual characteristics and several family variables 
(including various uses of a textile-father dummy: D, ND, and SD), as well as dummies for region 
and nativity, all used here as in the logit models. 
The regression results for nation and region, presented in Table 6, add a new dimension to 
the wage-keeping story. The national model shows the enduring importance of household 
circumstances in shaping the dynamics of the wage-keeping bargain. And once again, southern 
women, especially those with fathers in textiles, had the advantage. But in these regressions, 
unlike in the logit models, individual characteristics did matter. Among those mill girls who got 
to keep something, older daughters who had greater personal earnings capabilities were likely to 
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control more money. As indicated by the coefficients for I and F, a woman's personal earnings 
were considerably more important than her family's overall income in determining how much 
money she kept for herself. Household and regional circumstances were the principal factors that 
separated the keepers from the nonkeepers, but for the minority of women who were in a position 
to keep something, individual job skills paid. 
[Table 6 about here] 
As the two regional models in Table 6 show, the dynamics of wage-keeping in Dixie and 
New England were largely dissimilar. In the southern model, the results for I and F followed the 
national pattern and indicated the relative importance of individual wage-earning ability, but it is 
equally clear that family circumstances once again predominated (collectively at least) as the 
factors that shaped wage-bargaining outcomes. The results for New England, however, highlight 
individual traits, A and I; unlike in the South, family circumstances were inconsequential. It is 
instructive, though, that the dummy variable N shows a positive and significant relationship 
between native-born fathers and daughters who kept more of their paychecks, indicating once 
again that working women of immigrant fathers were at a comparative disadvantage in bargaining 
for control of their earnings. 
The state-level regressions presented in Table 7 take the analysis one final step and 
confirm two important points. First, for those who managed to keep some of their earnings, 
individual earning-power was the most consistent factor, from state to state, in allowing a 
daughter to keep a larger share. Perhaps this process of individual advancement was the sort of 
emancipative autonomy that Shorter had in mind. The irony is that getting to the point of 
keeping some wages in the first place had nothing to do with individual ambition or skill or even 
age. Some daughters who found themselves in a good bargaining situation appeared to have made 
the most of their good fortune--they made more and kept more; but they had no observable 
influence in creating that positive bargaining environment. Whether they kept something in the 
first place was, according to the data at hand, beyond their control. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Second, the results in Table 7 reflect the divergent experiences of working women in the 
various states. Variables A, J¥, and D are significant in only a single state each; F is significant in 
only two of six states. Even within regions, the factors that determined who kept more were 
surprisingly at odds. The point is not trivial. So much of women's history relies on general 
notions of gendered relationships, and so much of labor history relies on notions of "class" 
experience, both of which are generally assumed to have been universally felt by all women and 
all workers, and, in this case, by all working-class women. If differences are said to exist, they 
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are said to exist along racial or ethnic lines, or perhaps regional lines, but the numbers here 
suggest a more complex reality. Examining the coefficients in Table 7, for example, young 
working women in North Carolina seem to have encountered a different wage-bargaining 
environment than their fellow cotton mill girls in neighboring South Carolina, even though, on the 
surface, these women and their family circumstances were virtually identical. It is therefore 
difficult to see how "southern" working women could have forged a collective regional 
consciousness that embodied universally understood notions of class or gender. How much harder, 
then, for "American" working women to forge a national consciousness? 
But perhaps it is too much to ask for a national or even regional consciousness. The 
original question was not about consciousness but experience, about whether industrial labor had a 
liberating effect on working-class daughters. The basic answer seems to be no. The data strongly 
suggests that female earnings were seen almost exclusively as part of the family economy. The 
wages a daughter brought home, and the determinants of how that money was allocated, only 
enhanced, rather than challenged, the basic dynamics of working-class domesticity. On the 
surface, the surprising results for the South add further support for continuity. In a region so 
devoted to traditional gender roles, how could wage-keeping have been so much more prevalent 
than in New England? One answer is that wage-keeping in the South was more widely accepted 
because it did nothing to threaten social conventions. 
Such a conclusion is difficult to accept enthusiastically, however. Were young adult mill 
women in Dixie--the 39 percent of those who kept some of their wages--truly unaffected by their 
wage-keeping experiences? Perhaps not. Although evidence is scattered and anecdotal, by the 
late 1920s there seemed to have emerged a generation of southern mill girls who were more daring 
and unconventional than their forbearers. Certainly they were more devoted to consumerism, to 
fashion, and to the subtle power of petty social deviance. In scattered mill towns across the South, 
female cotton millers could be seen dressing like flappers, defying parental demands, precipitating 
strikes, and flaunting their sexuality in the face of male authorities. Notions of southern 
womanhood by no means changed overnight, but, by the time of the Great Depression, regional 
customs, even matters of gender, had changed in noticeable ways. 25 The reasons for these 
changes were many, including trends in national culture, but one factor that has heretofore been 
overlooked is the influence of the mothers. After all, the mothers of the 1920s mill girls were, in 
large part, the generation of southern mill girls who were surveyed in 1908, the ones who had 
been twice as likely as northern girls to keep some of their factory earnings. Apparently those 
working girls from the 1908 sample did leave home only to marry and tend to another home. But 
maybe they also raised daughters who had an eye toward expanding, however slightly, the social 
and economic opportunities for women in Dixie. At least one mill-working man in Georgia 
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noticed the changes and responded. In the 1920s he took an unprecedented step. As his daughter 
recalled, "one thing Daddy demanded was that each one of his boys take cooking lessons as much 
as the girls .... He said 'you'll get married and you can't ever tell--there's nothing that says your 
wife's going to be able at all times to cook and to take care of things."'26 
By the end of World War II the family-wage economy, as it existed in first decade of the 
century, had virtually disappeared. The change had occurred gradually and owed itself to the 
maturation of the work force, the decline in child labor, and the codification of those trends in 
New Deal labor legislation. By the end of the 1940s, school age children would, by and large, be 
in school, and those who worked part time (or those who dropped out and worked full time) 
would not hand over their unopened paychecks to their parents. It is testimony to the enduring 
impact of the Depression and World War II on the national economy and social structure that the 
subject of keeping one's wages, something of such importance to federal investigators in the first 
decade of the century, would now be taken for granted by parents and children alike. Today, 
single working women in the United States, even working-class women, have far greater freedom 
to shape their economic destinies than wage-earning daughters did eighty years ago. It does not 













on a farm 
Percentage whoa 
spent childhood 
in a city 
N 
"Cotton Mill Girls": Comparisons Between New England and the South 
New England 
20.3 19.4 






a These figures are not calculated from the data set used throughout this article. They are 
calculated from aggregate state figures, which are part of the same government study of textile 
workers, but which combine data on all children under sixteen years old with data on wage-
earning daughters sixteen and over. There were three categories for "Early Childhood Spent": 
"On Farm," "In Village," and "In City." 
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, figures are calculated from U.S. Senate, Report on Condition of 
Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States (GPO, 1910), vol. 1, Cotton Textile Industry, 








Chi-square (1 d.f.) 81.18 











Source: U.S. Senate, Report on Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States 
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a Excluding those who kept nothing. 
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Standard deviations for average percentage of wages kept ranged from .14 (Rhode Island) to .21 
(Georgia). 
Source: U.S. Senate, Report on Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States 
(GPO, 1910), vol. 1, Cotton Textile Industry, Table XXX, pp. 932-1013. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Keeping "'ages; National and Regional Logit Estimates 
(Dependent Variable = Keepers: 1 if woman kept some earnings, 0 otherwise) 
South 
Constant -3.08 
(A) Age .02 
(1.19) 
(I) Individual .001 
Earnings (1.52) 
(W) Weavers .20 
(1.09) 
(F) Family .0001 
Earnings (.54) 
(Y) Younger -.06 
Siblings (1.58) 
(0) Older .68 
Siblings (7 .26) 
(S) Single -.27 
Parent (1.47) 
(M) Mom Works .34 
for Wages (1.04) 
(D) Dad in .56 
Textiles (3.36) 
(ND) North Dad 
in Textiles 















































































Source: U.S. Senate, Report on Condition of lVoman and Child FVage-Earners in the United States 
(GPO, 1910), vol. 1, Cotton Textile Industry, Table XXX, pp. 932-1013. 
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Independent Variables: 
(A) Age in years. 
(I) Annual earnings of worker, in dollars. 
(W) Dummy for weavers= 1 if weaver, 0 otherwise. 
(F) Annual earnings of woman's family, in dollars. 
(Y) Number of children in home under 16 years of age. 
(0) Number of children in home 16 years or older. 
(S) Dummy for women in single parent households = 1 if lives with single parent, 0 otherwise. 
(M) Dummy for women whose mothers work for wages outside the home= 1 if mother works, 0 
otherwise. 
(D) Dummy for women whose fathers work in the textile industry= 1 if in textiles, 0 otherwise. 
(ND) Dummy for northern women whose fathers work in textiles = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 
(SD) Dummy for southern women whose fathers work in textiles = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 
(R) Dummy designating region in which a woman lives= 1 if Southern, 0 if Northern. 
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Source: U.S. Senate, Report on Condition of Woman and Child fVage-Earners in the United States 
(GPO, 1910), vol. 1, Cotton Textile Industry, Table XXX, pp. 932-1013. 
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Independent Variables: 
(A) Age in years. 
(I) Annual earnings of worker, in dollars. 
(W) Dummy for weavers= 1 if weaver, 0 otherwise. 
(F) Annual earnings of woman's family, in dollars. 
(Y) Number of children in home under 16 years of age. 
(0) Number of children in home 16 years or older. 
(S) Dummy for women in single parent households = 1 if lives with single parent, 0 otherwise. 
(M) Dummy for women whose mothers work for wages outside the home= 1 if mother works, 0 
otherwise. 
(D) Dummy for women whose fathers work in the textile industry = 1 if in textiles, 0 otherwise. 
(N) Dummy for women whose fathers were native- born Americans = 1 if native born, 0 otherwise. 
(NI) Dummy for women from "new" immigrant groups = 1 if new immigrant, (Italian, Polish, 
Portuguese), 0 if old immigrant (English, Irish, French Canadian). 
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Table 6. Who Kept More?: Ordinary Least-Squares Regression Estimates for Nation and Region 
u.s. 
Constant -55.65 
(A) Age 1.45 
(3.06) 
(I) Individual .33 
Earnings (12.76) 
(W) Weavers 5.96 
(1.08) 
(F) Family .01 
Earnings (3.18) 
(Y) Younger -4.47 
Siblings (3.58) 
(D) Dad in 
Textiles 
(ND) North Dad -13.29 
in Textiles (1.43) 
(SD) South Dad 15.28 
in Textiles (2.67) 








































Source: U.S. Senate, Report on Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners in the United States 
(GPO, 1910), vol. I, Cotton Textile Industry, Table XXX, pp. 932-1013. 
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Independent Variables: 
(A) Age in years. 
(I) Annual earnings of worker, in dollars. 
(W) Dummy for weavers= 1 if weaver, 0 otherwise. 
(F) Annual earnings of woman's family, in dollars. 
(Y) Number of children in home under 16 years of age. 
(D) Dummy for women whose fathers work in the textile industry= 1 if in textiles, 0 otherwise. 
(ND) Dummy for northern women whose fathers work in textiles = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 
(SD) Dummy for southern women whose fathers work in textiles = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. 
(R) Dummy designating region in which a woman lives = 1 if Southern, 0 if Northern. 
(N) Dummy for women whose fathers were native-born Americans= 1 if native-born, 0 otherwise. 
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Source: U.S. Senate, Report on Condition of Woman and Child fVage-Earners in the United States 
(GPO, 1910), vol. 1, Cotton Textile Industry, Table XXX, pp. 932-1013. 
27 
Independent Variables: 
(A) Age in years. 
(I) Annual earnings of worker, in dollars. 
(W) Dummy for weavers= 1 if weaver, 0 otherwise. 
(F) Annual earnings of woman's family, in dollars. 
(Y) Number of children in home under 16 years of age. 




1. Anderson, Family Structure; Bodnar, et al., Lives of Their Own; Hareven, Family Time and 
Industrial Time; Yans-McLaughlin, Family and Community; Hall, et al., Like a Family; Flamming, 
Creating the Modern South. 
2. Shorter, "Female Emancipation," pp. 615-17. 
3. Goldin, "Family Strategies"; Goldin and Sokoloff, "Women, Children, and Industrialization"; Cross 
and Shergold, "The Family Economy"; Tilly and Scott, Women, Work, and the Family; Walkowitz, 
Worker, City, Company Town; Benson, Counter Cultures; and see the works cited below in notes 4-7. 
4. Evans, Born for Liberty, quote on p. 161, and see 156-162, 182-86. Kessler-Harris, Out to Work, 
analyzes women's work within the framework of family roles. Drawing on Dublin, Women at Work, 
she focuses on the Lowell textile girls of the early nineteenth century and argues that the earliest 
generation of wage-earning women viewed their work as part of a larger contribution to the new 
Republic and as a means of preserving their personal independence--both within and without the 
family. The ideals and economic market which allowed this neat balance tipped when the 1830s 
economic depression forced women's wages down, and when the middle-class "Domestic Ideology" 
rendered women's work outside the home as destructive to familial stability and normal childhood 
development. These new family ideals "forced women to articulate reasons for working and to 
formalize a sense of jobs as instruments for family survival." As a result, women no longer undertook 
wage work for "self -realization, ambition, [or] independence." Instead, K.essler-Harris argues, young 
females came to see remunerative employment as a means of sustaining and perpetuating the domestic 
ideal. However much working girls' own ambitions clashed with parental objectives, manufacturers, 
vocational reformers, and male workers, not to mention married women, ultimately helped shape a 
separate labor market for women, married or not, in which the family, not the job or career, would 
remain the primary point of focus. 
5. Stansell, City of Women, quotes on pp. 218, 221. 
6. Peiss, Cheap Amusements, quote on p. 187. 
29 
7. Tentler, Wage-Earning fVomen, quotes on pp. 8, 86. In a similar vein, Tilly, "The Family Wage 
Economy," analyzes the relationship between family and industrial work in a French textile city 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. She concludes that households purposefully 
adapted their behavior to the new urban-industrial environment, and that the result was an increased 
curtailment of individual autonomy for both wives and children. 
Studies of American working women who lived away from home generally make similar 
arguments. In America's large cities, an increasing number of single females moved away from home 
to become relatively independent wage earners. These "women adrift," as concerned middle-class 
progressives called them, often encountered the hard side of urban life--vice, crime, disease, grinding 
poverty. They also banded together in vibrant networks of companionship and mutual support. Most 
importantly, according to Meyerowitz, T¥omen Adrift, they took possession of their leisure time, 
"defied the sexual double standard," and, in so doing, "helped forge the modern sexual expression that 
replaced Victorian reticence" (p. 141). Cross and Shergold, "The Family Economy," have addressed 
the issue of women adrift through an econometric analysis of working women in Pennsylvania in 
1894. They demonstrate that the likelihood of single women being on their own increased in 
accordance to their wages and ages, and that women in larger cities lived apart from families more 
than their small-town counterparts. The more hours a young woman worked, the lower her wages, 
the younger her age, the more likely she was to remain with her parents. Marketplace forces worked 
both to push and pull certain women away from their families, and ultimately created both the desire 
and outlet for greater individual independence. Yet Cross and Shergold note that familial bonds 
remained strong, and their data show that the majority of single working women in all types of 
households continued to live with their parents and contribute most of their earnings to the family 
purse. 
8. U.S. Senate, Report, demonstrated that the proportion of males in the industry had been increasing, 
North and South, since the turn of the twentieth century. The reason, the authors concluded, was that 
the industry was expanding so rapidly the demand for millhands had exceeded the available supply 
of female workers (see pp. 28-35). Basic works on New England textiles include, Dublin, fVomen at 
Work; Gerstle, Working-Class Americanism; Hareven, Family Time; Lamphere, From Working 
Daughters to Working Mothers; Prude, The Coming of Industrial Order; see also, for the mid-Atlantic 
states, Walkowitz, Worker City, Company Town; and Wallace, Rockdale. On southern textiles see, 
Carlton, !Ifill and Town; Flamming, Creating the Modern South; Hall, et al., Like a Family; McHugh, 
Mill Family; Newby, Plain Folk; and Tullos, Habits of Industry. 
9. See, U.S. Senate, Report, ch. I; Wright, Old South, New South. 
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10. U.S. Senate, Report, ch. I; Hall, et al., Like a Family; Hareven, Family Time; McHugh, Mill 
Family. 
II. An explanation of the data, followed by the state tables, is in U.S. Senate, Report, pp. 932-1013. 
The published tables include data on the woman's father (race, nativity, years in United States, 
occupation), on the woman's mother (basic condition: home, work, or dead); on the woman herself 
(age, occupation, days worked past year, years since beginning work, ability to read and write, and 
months of school attended); on the household (number of children under 10, number of children 10-
13, number of children 14-15, number of children 16 and over, total number of children in home, 
total wage earners among children at home); on household earnings (earnings of father, earnings of 
mother, earnings of children under 14, earnings of children 14-15, earnings of children 16 and over, 
other income, total earnings and income during past year, amount retained by children 16 and over, 
rent past year, per capital weekly income of family). Throughout I use various terms to refer to the 
women in the sample--working girls, cotton mill girls, wage-earning daughters, working women, and 
so on--none of which are intend to be value laden; specifically, I do not intend the term "girl" to be 
demeaning. 
12. The government's estimate for a woman's annual mill income was derived by taking into 
consideration both her "normal" weekly or bi-weekly wages (as indicated by company records during 
an unexceptional payroll period) and her own estimates of yearly earnings and days worked. In 
assessing the reliability of the data for earnings, the federal officials noted: "As a result of this careful 
questioning [of the woman and of family members], the reports of days worked and earnings were 
as accurate as it is possible to secure in the absence of detailed records. They are, however, 
necessarily only approximate, sometimes with a considerable error in the case of the individual, but 
probably not far from the facts when taken together or in groups of any considerable number" (U.S. 
Senate, Report, p. 933). For more on the probability of error in the data, see ibid, pp. 416-18. 
13. On the different proportion of earnings contributed to the family income by males and females, 
see U.S. Senate, Report, pp. 436-37. The data in the report does indicate if the working-girl had 
sisters over sixteen working in the same mill, but in most cases the number of children over sixteen 
exceeds the number of sisters in the mill; since we have no idea about the gender of the unlisted 
siblings, the evidence on sisters does not allow for a more precise estimate of Share. 
14. U.S. Senate, Report, p. 352. 
15. Lowrance interview. 
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16. It might be argued that a better regression strategy would be to use all the data for amount of 
wages kept, rather than to divide the cases into two categories (keepers and nonkeepers) for a logit. 
We should never eliminate unnecessarily a good deal of useful data, and a standard least-squares 
model would allow us to ask "who kept how much?", but using a dependent variable with 70 percent 
zeros involves its own problems. The basic problem seems initially to be that the dependent variable 
is "censored"; that is, the true value of each zero is censored at some unknown threshold, which, if 
surpassed, would lead to some dollar amount being kept. If a censorship situation exists, least squares 
models cannot be trusted. The simple answer to a censorship problem is to use a tobit model. But 
it might be argued, to the contrary, that no censorship problem actually exits, since zero has a definite 
meaning for all cases and is, in fact, exactly what we wish to measure. In an earlier pilot study, 
neither the least squares model or the tobit seemed more appropriate than a logit; see Flamming, 
"Regression Options for Historians." Also, it seemed to me that "to keep" or "not to keep" was indeed 
the critical question and that logit therefore offered a cleaner approach to the issue. 
17. A dummy variable for Literacy was used in many different models and never came close to being 
statistically significant; it was excluded here simply to trim these already complicated models. 
18. The relationship could, of course, run the opposite direction. If daughters saw their working 
mothers living lives of excessive drudgery--holding full-time jobs outside and inside the home--their 
commitment to a traditional family structure might have been strengthened, not weakened, by their 
mother's wage-earning experience. Aldrich, "Determinants of Mortality," demonstrates that wage-
earning mothers in the Fall River, Massachusetts, textile industry (1908-1912) had a mortality rate 
nearly three times that of other local residents and states that "little evidence exists to suggest that 
married women workers would have been subject to such excess mortality had they remained at 
home." Hence, a reasonable possibility existed that the relationship between M and Keepers would 
be negative. As the logits in this article show, however, there was no significant relationship in either 
direction. 
19. Any coefficient with at-score of 2 (technically 1.96) is statistically significant at the .05 level or 
better. Logit models do not assume linearity. As a consequence, the estimated coefficients are not 
adequate indicators of the relative strength of the relationship; so, unlike least-squares coefficients, 
logit coefficients do not have predictive properties. The key to interpreting logit results lies not in 
the coefficients but in the statistical significance of the variables; we are interested here in identifying 
the cluster of factors that determined wage-keeping patterns. There is no readily acceptable means 
for comparing the relative magnitude of the significant variables in a logit model. 
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20. Age and work experience were found to be very highly correlated. 
21. The data used here, table 30 from volume I of the Senate report, does not include religion; it only 
provides nativity and ethnicity for the daughter's fathers. Among the New Englanders, 82 percent 
of the sample could be classified, by way of ethnicity, as nominally Catholic. Jewish immigrants did 
not normally gravitate into cotton mill work (the main exception being the Jewish silk mill workers 
in Paterson, New Jersey) although Jews were a commercial presence in many Catholic mill 
communities. On the relationship between ethnicity and religion among New England mill workers 
in the early twentieth century, see Lamphere, Working Daughters, ch. 2; Gerstle, Working-Class 
Americanism, chs. 1-2; and Goldberg, A Tale of Three Cities pp. 26-31, 49-55, 86-90; 
Among southerners, 99.8 were daughters of native-born Americans, or, more accurately, 
native-born southerners, since it was almost unheard of for Yankees to move South on textile work 
in Dixie's low-wage mills. Most southern millhands were Baptists of one brand or another, and the 
others were Methodists or Holiness, with perhaps a very few Presbyterians; I have never heard of a 
Catholic or Jewish cotton mill worker in the South. See Hall, et al., Like a Family; Flamming, 
Creating the Modern South; Newby, Plain Folk; Pope, Mil/hands and Preachers; and Tullos, Habits 
of Industry. 
22. Goldberg, A Tale of Three Cities, p. 90. 
23. Using ethnicity as a proxy for religion, I ran regressions with a dummy variable designating 
Catholic women. The variable proved statistically insignificant in every model, but the measurement 
was too untrustworthy to count for much. I counted as Catholic those women whose fathers were 
French Canadian (54 percent of all northerners), Irish (16 percent), Portuguese (7 percent), Italian (3 
percent), and Polish (2 percent). English immigrants (9 percent) could be considered Protestant. 
There were a scattering of fathers who were not part of any major ethnic group in the New England 
mills (6 percent); these cases were, by turns, put into the model as "non-Catholics" and left out of the 
equation as "missing data," with no change in the significance of the dummy for Catholics. The real 
problem, however, was those women whose fathers were listed as "American" (5 percent). These men 
could have been Yankee Protestants or, perhaps more likely, third generation Irish, who almost 
certainly would have been Catholic; and there is no way to disentangle these two groups of 
"Americans" in the model. 
24. I excluded the variable for older siblings because it was highly correlated with F, and I excluded 
the dummy variables for single parents and working mothers, in an effort to simplify the analysis, 
after both variables proved consistently insignificant and ineffective in model after model. 
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25. Flamming, Creating the A1odern South; Hall, "Disorderly Women"; Janiewski, Sisterhood Denied. 
26. Thompson interview. 
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